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BOOKS
ON COMPLAINING ABOUT THE BURGER COURT
THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN'T. Edited by Vincent Blasi. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv, 326. $25.00.
Reviewed by Robert F Nagel *
In The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't distinguished
scholars assess the work of the Burger Court and generally pronounce themselves less dissatisfied than they expected to be. In criminal procedure, freedom of speech, and race discrimination, they conclude the Court has not
retreated from the ideals of the Warren Court to the degree anticipated; in
other areas--such as sex discrimination and abortion-the Burger Court
has been even bolder than the Warren Court. While the essays explore
these themes in useful detail, the themes themselves are not new. The essays
are therefore, with some exceptions, more interesting for what they reveal
about the authors than for what they reveal about the Court.1 To the extent that the authors' attitudes and standards represent those of an influential segment of the legal profession, 2 the book illuminates some of the
sources of the modem drive to increase judicial power and helps to explain
why that drive, feeding on its failures, builds even as it disappoints.
I.
The book is bracketed by explicit claims that the debate over judicial
activism is over. In the final chapter, Professor Shapiro argues that a new
generation of commentators is developing "a jurisprudence of values rather
than institutional roles" built on "their happy acceptance of. . .judicial
activism . . ." (p. 228). In the Foreword, Anthony Lewis writes that "the
great conflict between judicial 'restraint' and 'activism' is history now" (p.
ix). Asserting that neither commentators nor justices show much "self-con* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1968, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1972,
Yale University.
1. Indeed, Professor Shapiro's summing-up, Fathersand Sons." The Court, the Commentators,
and the Searchfor Values, is largely about changes in academic thinking about the Court (Pp.
218-38). Several of the chapters are, however, of considerable interest for their insights into
the Court itself-especially Professor Kamisar's analysis of criminal procedure cases, Professor Burt's treatment of family law issues, and Professor Blasi's essay on The Rootless Activism of
the Burger Court.
2. The Society of American Law Teachers sponsored the book. According to the authors' biographies the writers are affiliated with major universities, six hold chaired professorships, one is a federal appeals court judge, and three have been officers of the American Civil
Liberties Union (pp. 312-14).
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scious concern" for defining "a proper role for the Court," Lewis declares,
"[w]e are all activists now" (p. ix).
Lewis' use of the pronoun "we" is arresting. Simultaneously inclusive
and exclusive, it conveys perfectly the vague sense of clubbiness that characterizes much of the book. To whom does he refer with this apparently generous but subtly snobbish word? He surely does not include those citizens
who are dismayed and outraged that their local public schools are largely
run by judges, nor those who, furious with the Court's abortion decisions,
propose a constitutional amendment to return that matter to the states, nor
those who voted against the proposed Equal Rights Amendment partly because of a profound distrust of the brave possibilities that federal judges
might see in that provision. No, "we" surely refers only to "commentators"
and "justices." But how many commentators and justices can fairly be included? While activism can be defined so that everyone, including Justice
Rehnquist, approves of it, does anyone "comment and. . . decide" (p. ix)
without institutional considerations in mind? Unless their written opinions
are disregarded, none of the sitting justices fits Lewis' description, since each
has written about the need to define a limited and justifiable role for the
courts. 3 Legions of academic writers, including many in Shapiro's "new
generation" of commentators, 4 also work energetically to formulate a
3. Notable in this regard is Justice Blackmun, who wrote movingly in a death penalty
case about how such cases cause him "an excruciating agony of the spirit," yet declined to
cross the line from judicial decisionmaking into legislative policymaking. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 405-11 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Analogously, Justice Rehnquist gave
institutional reasons for declining to rule on the question of a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2321-25 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.). Other
justices have also expressed institutional concerns. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469,
3489 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71, 72-73 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Columbus Bd.of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479-89 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 562 (1979) (Court majority included Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Blackmun, and White; Justice Powell concurred);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 22, 27, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (Stevens, J.); National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
4. For works dealing with questions of institutional role and legitimacy, authored by
scholars Shapiro lists as belonging to the "new generation," (p. 309 n.5), see P. Brest & S.
Levinson, Process of Constitutional Decisionmaking, Cases and Materials (2d ed. 1983); J.
Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980); J. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust (1980); Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in Constitutional Law (Book Review), 80
Yale L.J. 176 (1970); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 703 (1975); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165 (1977); Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363 (1973); Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional
Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 116 (1974); Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1.

2070

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2068

proper role for the Court. Lewis suggests that the discussion is merely about
the goals of judicial activism, not about its appropriateness (p. ix), but this
is too slippery. Even Shapiro's review of the commentary on the Supreme
Court demonstrates that eminent scholars arrive at their recommendations
on the purposes of judicial power by focusing careful attention on institutional concerns. 5 Disagreements about the substantive objectives ofjudicial
review often reflect institutional disagreements.
Lewis' rather smug inclusiveness is not even accurate as applied to the
authors of the essays in the book to which he is contributing, many of whom
attempt to define an appropriate role for the Court by considering institutional issues. Professor Blasi's thoughtful essay on the "rootless activism" of
the Burger Court contains an effort to justify judicial power as a "corrective
to unduly parochial patterns of political behavior" (p. 210). Professor Bennett argues that "[w]hen the interests of the poor, or a particularly weak
segment of the poor, have been severely disadvantaged in a political forum,
the judiciary can appropriately intervene" (p. 57). Moreover, the criticism
that the Court has not sufficiently adhered to established principles-a requirement grounded in institutional concerns basic to judicial review 6appears in Professor Brest's chapter on race discrimination, in Professor
Kamisar's chapter on criminal procedure, and in Judge Ginsburg's chapter
on sex discrimination. Professor Burt's penetrating chapter on family law
criticizes both liberal and conservative blocks on the Court for abandoning
a proper institutional role, which he describes as leading "fundamentally
alienated combatants toward the pursuit of mutual accommodation" (p.
107).
These efforts, though briefly sketched in the book and perhaps unconvincing, do reflect a self-conscious concern for defining the proper role for
the judiciary. If anything, the essays suggest a nervous recognition that adequate justifications for activism are still needed. Such nervousness is understandable. The current ascendency of the judiciary exists on an
intellectual foundation that has been severely attacked and is in considerable disarray. 7 It is true that activism flourishes today, but it flourishes
5. Shapiro states:

Intellectual life is not such that one can expect a total disjunction in constitutional
thought when a change in generations occurs. For example, two members of the
newer generation of constitutional commentators, Jesse Choper and John Hart Ely,
have undertaken to preserve New Deal preferred position doctrines by grounding
them in more sophisticated political analysis. Both continue to focus on the role of
the Court [sic] problems so prominent in the 1950's.
(P. 222). He goes on to argue that Ely's process-oriented theory "will usually yield just that
substantive value that the others posit. . . : equality." Id. at 224. This sentence is footnoted
to an acknowledgement that Monaghan's institutional concerns also control the values that
he recommends courts pursue. Id. at 309 n.13.
6. Professor Brest makes an explicit connection between adherence to principle and the
legitimacy ofjudicial review when he notes that the Court's "only justification for meddling
in the affairs of other institutions is that its judgments are grounded in principle rather than
political expediency.

. .

."

V. Blasi, supra note 2, at 128.

7. Some of the most effective indictments of theories ofjudicial review have been written
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amidst pervasive unease about the legitimacy of judicial power. "We" are
all activists now, if we are, because of inertia, opportunism, or intellectual
resourcefulness that approaches sheer will, not because institutional questions have been resolved or have receded in importance. The insistence
that some happy consensus exists on the Court's proper role is wishful
thinking.
II.
Many of the authors emphasize that the Burger Court has not turned
out badly. What is odd is their ingratitude. Like children who expected
their gifts, several of the authors no sooner tear off the wrapping than they
are complaining.
Professor Emerson's essay on freedom of the press provides clear illustrations of this insatiability as well as clues as to its source. He complains
that "after more than a dozen years of the Burger Court, much of the press
has become seriously concerned. It feels that its First Amendment protections have been eroded and that it is being threatened. . ." (p. 1). What is
the basis for this anxiety? In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,8 the Court protected
the press from state libel laws, holding as a matter of constitutional law that
states must condition recovery for injury to reputation on a showing of at
least negligent conduct and actual injury. But Emerson criticizes the case
for "returning to a balancing test" and for holding that the actual malice
test should be limited to public officials and public figures (p. 4). Similarly,
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,9 the Court imposed severe restraints on
the power of courts to prohibit publication of information about trials.
to clear the ground for the proposal of a new theory. See, e.g., Ely, The Supreme Court 1977
Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1978); Perry,
Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 278 (1981). Of course, in their turn the new theories have been subjected to severe
criticism. On Perry's book, The Constitution, the Courts, andHumanRights, see Symposium: Ju-

dicial Review and the Constitution-the Text and Beyond, 8 U. Dayton L. Rev. 443 (1983).
On Ely's book Democraqy and Distrust, see, e.g., Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale LJ. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of
Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale UJ. 1037
(1980). See generally, Symposium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 1
(1981); Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Political Theory, 56
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259 (1981). Professor Berger has produced an insistent drumbeat of criticism,
see, e.g., R. Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977), and in turn has spawned comment. See
Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 261,285
n.100 (1981). Some skeptics now have gone so far as to question whether interpretation of a
written constitution can be anything other than an exercise of the readers' imagination. See,
e.g., Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982). Accordingly, some proponents
of judicial review think it is important to establish that the Constitution's text can provide
some constraint external to the judge. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan.
L. Rev. 739 (1982). In the face of this torrent of criticism and backpeddling, anyone who can
assert that there is a consensus on the Court's role fully deserves the peace of mind he has
been able to achieve.
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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Emerson describes the result as "an important victory for the press" but
then laments that "the manner of reaching it left the press less satisfied" (p.
7). The Pentagon Papers case'O "gave significant support to freedom of the
press" (p. 12). But because the press might still be subject to an injunction
if the government could prove "'direct, immediate, and irreparable damage' to national security," Emerson concludes that "the theoretical position
of the press does not appear strong" (p. 12).
Emerson states early in his essay that the Warren Court's record of
protection for the press might have been a matter of appearances; substantively it left important loopholes, including the use of the balancing test.
He also acknowledges that the Burger Court has expanded protections in
some areas. Nevertheless he arrives at the overall view that "[t]he press no
longer receives the vigorous support given it by the Warren Court" (p. 25).
Indeed, "the legal future of the press look[s] somewhat bleak." 1I
Emerson's lugubrious conclusion seems to result from his confusion of
the subjective state of "the press" with the content of the first amendment.
He continually evaluates first amendment issues according to whether the
Court demonstrated a "friendly attitude toward the press" (p. 10), whether
the Court came down "on the side of the press" (p. 11), and whether the
press was "satisfied" (p. 7). If the issue is framed according to whether "the
press can- take complete comfort from the Burger Court's approach" (p.
15), it is not surprising that the Court is found to be deficient.
The assumption that the Court's construction of the Constitution
should be evaluated by the extent to which interest groups are satisfied appears in other essays. Professor Bennett writes that the "courts are designedly insulated from the usual levers of political influence and thus are
particularly charged with ensuring that the benefits of the rule of law reach
the nation's poor" (p. 61). While describing the Warren Court's record
with regard to the poor as not "much beyond oversimplified catchphrases"
(p. 56) and while acknowledging that the Burger Court's record is mixedand in some respects very favorable to the poor-Bennett ends his article
with a severe indictment of the Burger Court's insensitivity "to the importance of litigation as a vehicle by which the rule of law is made available to
the poor population" (p. 58). Judge Ginsburg describes the Burger Court's
record on sex discrimination as "striking" in comparison to the record of its
predecessors (p. 132). She states that perhaps no Court has acted as "intrepidly" as the Burger Court did in the abortion area (p. 147). Nevertheless, she is constrained to say that "women could not be regarded as a
constituency of the Burger Court to the same extent that blacks were of the
Warren Court" (p. 151). Professor St. Antoine assesses the Burger Court's
record in labor law as "more moderate than the labor movement may have
anticipated," but he notes that decisions in areas such as secondary boycotts
10. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
11. Emerson's view is even more severe than this sentence suggests. He writes that "the
Burger Court has either forgotten or ignored the most fundamental tenet of First Amendment
theory. .... ." (P. 26).
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and shopping center picketing "tip the scales still further against union organizational efforts" (p. 179). And for the unsqueamish, Professor Shapiro
offers a "bald counting of constituencies." He tallies the gains and losses for
"racial minorities," "the poor," "government workers," "intellectuals," welfare recipients, "the business community," and so on (p. 219).12 That no
interest group has yet been fully satisfied is certainly not surprising; what is
suprising is that anyone should expect the Court to provide such satisfaction. Why, one wonders, adopt a standard that guarantees room for
disappointment?
III.
Satisfaction in being dissatisfied with the Burger Court is also evident
in the tendency to look closely at apparently "good" decisions to find less
praiseworthy concerns and explanations. Writing about free speech cases,
Professors Dorsen and Gora, for instance, see under the Court's apparent
themes less obvious and less laudable considerations. They first dangle the
bait: "The Burger Court's free speech cases sometimes contract earlier rulings of the Warren Court, sometimes expand them, and in some instances
dramatically chart new ground" (p. 31). Is this good? Not really, not if, as
the authors argue, the underlying pattern of these decisions demonstrates a
preference for property interests over free speech values (pp. 31-41).
The method by which the authors reach this "finding" (p. 31) is instructive. They first point to a series of cases in which free speech interests
coincide with property interests. In Spence v. Washington,13 for instance, the
Court protected expression by reversing the conviction of a man who had
taped a symbol to an American flag that he owned. A similar result was
reached in Wooley v. Maynard,14 which involved covering a message placed
by the State of New Hampshire on a privately owned license plate. Surely
such cases are to be expected; it is hard to imagine a free speech case in
which none of the speaker's property (whether a movie screen, a book, or an
armband) is involved. Moreover, any court concerned with constitutional
values ought to be especially sympathetic when property and speech coincide. The Constitution, after all, was designed by people who for good rea15
son did not sharply distinguish the concepts of "property" and "freedom."
12. Judge Ginsburg puts the Court in broader perspective with this forthright scorecard:
Also noteworthy in appraising gender discrimination decisions of the 1970s is the
comparatively cold reception the Burger Court has accorded to other constituencies
seeking to advance their positions on the equal protection spectrum. For the aging
and the poor, equal protection remains a lean cupboard. Aliens did well in the early
years of the Burger Court, but later the majority backtracked a considerable way.
In contrast, apart from the slight slump in Kahn v.Shevin, claims challenging explicit
sex classifications inched steadily along.

(P. 152) (footnotes omitted).
13. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
14. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
15. Madison, for example, argued that the traditional concept of property derived from
a broader concept of property that included "'opinions and the free communication of
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Dorsen and Gora then ask "what happens when the speech interest
and property interests conflict[?]" (p. 34). Their conclusion-that the Burger Court often favors property interests when they conflict with free speech
interests-is not, by itself, of much significance. Although the authors assert that there is "no basis in principle for preferring property interests over
speech values" (p. 41), no one can believe that first amendment values
should always prevail over other interests, including private property; surely
no one should have a right to put a soapbox in your living room. Cases that
subordinate speech interests to the commercial interests of shopping centers
or the privacy interest of parents might be criticized for drawing the lines
unwisely, but this is a critique that the authors do not make. Instead, their
point is simply that "property interests" were favored. This observation
obscures important differences among the interests protected and by itself is
useful only as a way of gaining a certain rhetorical advantage over the Burger Court among those who are reflexively in favor of "free speech" and
distrustful of "property."
Although Dorsen and Gora appear to suggest that the Burger Court
generally values property interests more than free speech (pp. 37, 41), the
authors cannot and, on close reading, probably do not claim that the Burger Court has been more solicitous of private property than.of free speech.
The Burger Court has made many notable decisions in the areas of privacy
and free speech, but has shown little inclination to protect traditional property interests. 1 6 It has, in fact, repeatedly protected the power of the state
them' " and "'the free use of. . .faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them."' Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal
Stud. 3, 11 (1983) (quoting and discussing Madison's comments).
16. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984); Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982); Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292
(1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117 (1978); County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977); City of Pittsburgh v. Alco
Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
Against this record can be set only a few instances where the Burger Court has protected
traditional property rights. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Allied Structura Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1 (1977).
In contrast, the Burger Court has made many major decisions protecting free speech
values. E.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
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to regulate property interests. Accordingly, Dorsen and Gora can conclude
merely that property is an "underlying theme" (p. 30) of the Burger Court's
free speech decisions, that the cases show a "close link" between protecting
free speech and protecting property (p. 44).
What is more intriguing than this bland thesis is the lengths to which
the authors are willing to go in order to fit cases into the "pattern" they
claim to have found. To support their view that the Court somehow is
lukewarm toward free speech, they use cases that demonstrate precisely the
opposite conclusion-that the Burger Court is inclined to protect the states'
power to safeguard speech interests through restrictions on private property. For example, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,17 the Court upheld
a state's construction of its constitution that required a private shopping
center to permit a group to gather signatures on a petition, despite the
Court's earlier decisions rejecting such a requirement as a matter of federal
constitutional law. The authors admit that "[a]t first glance" Prune ardappears to have been a major victory for free speech values over property
values, since it enables demonstrators to use shopping center grounds as a
matter of state constitutional law (p. 37). Nevertheless, the authors assert,
"close examination" demonstrates that PruneYard merely vindicated the
states' power to *regulate property and thus does not represent significant
protection for free speech values (p. 37). Now, a case that validates the
power of the states to restrict property rights in order to protect free speech
values contradicts-to some degree-the thesis that the Court is partial to
property values, and the case is plainly some evidence that the Court values
free speech. Of course, the Court might have decided the case in a way more
favorable to free speech values, but this possiblity, which always exists, does
not convert the decision into a victory for private property. A modest gift is
still a gift. The authors' analysis of PruneYard amounts to willful insistence
that the Burger Court be portrayed in an unfavorable light.
This insistence at times has dizzying results. Dorsen and Gora conclude that in Young v. American Mini Theatres,'8 where the Court upheld a
zoning ordinance designed to regulate the location of "adult theaters," the
Court was again dominated by property considerations. They convert the
Court's approval of state regulation of private property into a vindication of
private property by lumping the locality's concerns about protecting neighborhoods into the term "property" (p. 39). But such interests as the tone of
a neighborhood, its aesthetic characteristics, and public safety belong to no
one in particular. They are public interests, not private property. Moreover, if the Court had reached the opposite result in Young, the authors
would only have found further evidence for their thesis that the Court tends
to favor ownership interests.
The authors remove any doubt of this with their discussion of Erznoznik
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

17. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).

18. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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v. City ofJacksonville,19 which struck down a requirement that the owner of
an outdoor movie theater build a visual barrier before showing movies displaying nudity. Dorsen and Gora make it clear that the interests of the
theater owners are property interests (p. 39). They argue that in Erznoznik
"the property interests of the community were not as weighty [as in Young]"
(p. 39). Again, why are the locality's interests in avoiding moral offense and
ensuring traffic safety "property interests" of any kind? The authors say
that the Court found these interests less weighty because "the screen was on
a busy highway and visible only from two adjacent streets and from a littleused church parking lot" (p. 39) (footnote omitted). This assertion is probably an oblique effort to suggest that the "neighborhood" interests vindicated in Young were actually the property interests of residential home
owners, interests which were missing or of less weight in Erznoznik. But
churches are owned, as are the homes along those two adjacent streets. The
unavoidable fact is that in both cases the locality attempted to accomplish
public objectives, such as safety and moral tone, and that the achievement
of such objectives inevitably benefits not only the public but also individuals and their property. In Erznoznik the Court made a strained effort to
protect the free speech interest of the owners of outdoor theaters. That the
Court is willing to substitute its judgment about the wisdom of public policies for that of local authorities shows something about its self-assurance but
nothing at all about any failure to accord sufficient weight to free speech
values.
The mind is reeling by the time Dorsen and Gora discuss the Court's
complicated decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.20 Does a case
-that extends first amendment protections to owners of billboards promote
free speech or private property? If the case partially subordinates the billboard owners' interests (however labelled) to the authority of the state to
achieve aesthetic objectives, does the case demonstrate a priority on state
regulatory power or on private property served by public regulation? If the
state's power to regulate for these public purposes (however described) is
then subordinated to the free speech interest in preventing content discrimination against noncommercial messages, does the case demonstrate a preference for free speech or a tender regard for the property rights of purveyors
of noncommercial messages? Relax. The authors cut easily through the
complications:
The billboard decision demonstrates two of the themes we have
observed. First, government will be allowed to favor the speech
and property interests of occupants of the particular property
* * **But beyond that, when speech interests conflict with property values protected by government through aesthetic zoning,
speech will take second place. . . (pp. 40-41).
Fortunately, none of the other authors goes to such lengths to find
unattractive themes underlying the Burger Court's decisions. But some do
19. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
20. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

1984]

THE BURGER COURT

2077

have a milder inclination in the same direction. Professor Bennett's usually
evenhanded assessment of the Burger Court's treatment of the poor makes
an effort to explain favorable decisions on grounds other than concern for
the poor. He argues that the poor generally prevail when their interests
coincide with "another decisional theme with which the Court has felt comfortable" (p. 53). These themes are said to include a sensitivity to issues
surrounding gender, illegitimacy, the right to travel, and procedural values
(p. 53). Poverty, of course, is never the only issue in a case. It is natural and
inevitable that a court's evaluation of legal claims of the poor will be influenced by the context in which those claims arise. That this should occur
demonstrates nothing exceptional about the attitudes of the members of the
Court.
Professor Burt's argument is, in part, that announced concerns about
parental authority and family life "are an unacknowledged proxy for a different social concern regarding the strength and legitimacy" of social authority (p. 93). His analysis of the cases is illuminating and tends to confirm
the claim. But in this essay the urge to deflate the Burger Court appears in
the exaggeration with which the insight is stated: "[The members of the
conservative nucleus of the Court] have concluded that our contemporary
national life is so fractionated that any challenge to constituted authority
excessively undermines the legitimacy of all authority, that we must recapture an earlier social attitude of unquestioning deference to authority..."
(p. 103). Surely no one anywhere believes that "any" challenge to authority
undermines the legitimacy of "all authority." Attributing such exaggerated
notions to the Burger Court only demonstrates how irresistible is the urge to
cast that Court in an unfavorable light.
The effort to find unobvious themes is a staple of legal scholarship.
But in this book the tactic is used so stubbornly and so judgmentally that it
seems suddenly curious. The search for underlying and disappointing reasons casts the Court in the role of something like a close friend whose decisions must not merely have a valid basis but must reflect views deeply
consonant with our own. The insistent urge to undercut the Burger Court
seems, then, to reflect a proportionately ambitious urge to have a complete
sense of moral sympathy and intimacy with the Court. This paradoxical
relationship is also suggested by the other ways in which these authors look
closely at apparently benign decisions. When they are not looking under
the Court's announced explanations, they are looking behind them for realworld influences, and above them for larger attitudes and visions.
Why, for example, has the Burger Court's initial hostility to the Warren Court's decisions on police practices subsided of late? It may be that
some of the justices have been " 'liberalized' by their closeness to these difficult problems" (p. 91). Or perhaps "overzealous government lawyers. ..
have led one or more justices to appreciate the need to resist encroachment
• .." (p. 91), Why did Justice Burger support a probusing position in the
Swann case? "[O]ne need only consider (as he must have) the symbolism of
the new chief justice breaking the Court's tradition of unanimity in school
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desegregation" (p. 117). Why has the Burger Court continued to push for
school desegregation? "[A]n explanation lies partly in an institutional nostalgia for the Court's historic role in the civil rights struggle of the 1950's
and 1960's. . ." (p. 119). Why has the Burger Court shown such surprising
receptivity to sex discrimination claims? It might be a result of the increasing numbers of women in the work force, the revitalization of the feminist
movement, the development of effective means of controlling reproduction,
and the "decreasing incidence of a single life partner" (pp. 139, 151).
Such explanations may or may not be accurate, but in either event
they also communicate an implicit view of the Supreme Court as a person
rather than an institution. As a person, the Court can be thought to respond to the same kinds of motives and perceptions that affect us in our
private lives. Seen as a person, the Court performs unsatisfactorily because
even its laudable actions are the result of social or psychological forces
rather than such banal but appropriate influences as legal argument.
If a personalized and reduced view of the Court cannot be achieved by
looking behind its decisions, it often can be achieved by looking above them
for their more ethereal emanations. Professor Emerson criticizes the Burger
Court's "attitude toward the press" in Branzburg v. Haye 2 1 because the
Court "is satisfied if the press is not subjected to 'official harassment'" (p.
17). The Court is insensitive or "unsympathetic" (p. 25) and has "lost that
feeling for the dynamics of the system of freedom of expression which was
the hallmark of the Warren Court" (p. 26). Professors Dorsen and Gora see
nothing improper in some judicial regard for property rights, which after all
enable people to "hire a good lawyer" (p. 41). But they perceive a different
value hovering over the Court's regard for property:
In terms of attitudes and imagery, free speech and property rights
are different kinds of liberty. The protection of property is bottomed on the protection of "settled expectations" within the
larger context of a model of society that is orderly, stable, and
rational. Such a vision of society is apparently congenial to the
Burger Court and its partisans. (Pp. 44-45.)
Professor Burt sets out to discover the "attitude" conveyed by the
Court's family law decisions (pp. 93, 95). Roe v. Wade22 is "perhaps the
most egregious instance of the Court's desire to stifle conflict" (p. 109) and
more generally the Burger Court "displays a distaste for direct, prolonged
conflict and [does not] appreciate the importance of such conflict in forging
communal bonds. . . " (p. 112).
Like underlying themes and theories of social causation, a court's attitudes--its insensitivities, sympathies, visions, tenor, and desires-are revealing and sometimes important. They help predict future directions and
put discrete holdings in a larger perspective. In this book, however, their
emphasis suggests both an inappropriate need for sympathetic intimacy
21. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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with the Court and a perverse satisfaction in being able to find the Court
inadequate. Public institutions are not parents or friends or spouses, yet
much of this book evaluates the Court as if it should serve the same sorts of
emotional needs.
IV.
The puzzle presented by this book, then, is why many of the authors
enjoy disapproving of a court for which they have such high aspirations, a
court that-beyond all realistic predictions-has used its power in accordance with their own beliefs and values. This question bears on a more
general one. Why does so much of the legal establishment, which purports
to be disaffected with the Burger Court, retain so much enthusiasm for judicial review?
These questions are illuminated, I believe, by the place of the Warren
Court in the book. For most of the essayists the Warren Court and its glo23
ries, real or imagined, are the touchstone for evaluating the Burger Court.
Although several of them acknowledge that the Warren Court's actual performance sometimes was no better and sometimes was worse than the performance of the Burger Court, 24 the Warren Court retains its emotional
lure and its intellectual power for the bulk of these writers.
Professor Brest begins his essay with this astonishing sentence: "The
Warren Court really had it pretty easy" (p. 113). Brest attributes this truth,
which no doubt eluded the members of that Court, to the fact that by 1953
overt racism in the South was "widely perceived as a national moral disaster" (p. 113). He continues, "Civil rights in the 1960's was a good guys/bad
guys issue (perhaps the last one we shall be blessed with) and there was no
doubt which side the Court was on" (p. 113). This is, at the least, curious
phrasing. The existence of moral disasters is not a blessing for those who
suffer through them; they can be a blessing for those who had a hand in
correcting them but are especially so in the kind of rosy glow prevalent at
meetings of elderly veterans long finished with their wars.
Moral disasters are not fun, but they do, as Brest suggests, sometimes
sharpen and simplify public issues. Brest's nostalgia for the days of moral
clarity is repeated in a more serious tone by Professor Blasi, who writes,
"The [Burger Court] justices have crafted some significant practical compromises, but have not exerted any kind of moral force either by legitimizing nascent aspirations or by reinvigorating dormant ideals" (p. 212). The
Warren Court, in contrast, created a direction for constitutional law that
"was both clear and, to many, inspiring" (p. 212) (footnote omitted).
The essays read as a whole suggest that the Warren Court, although its
doctrinal developments and actual accomplishments were less than fully
satisfactory, successfully represented a unified moral vision. Professor Sha23. For examples of this attitude, see pp. 25-27, 31, 46-47, 62-91, 113-16, 132-33,
151-52, 157, 168, 199, 203, 211-17, 218-38.
24. For such acknowledgments, see pp. 1,29, 46, 56, 63-68, 113, 132, 157, 180, 201, 204.
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piro writes that the Warren Court worked out a set of values "that had
achieved an overwhelming consensus produced by one of the few great crises and value reorderings in American political history" (pp. 237-38). Shapiro acknowledges that critics existed but preserves his thesis by ascribing
the criticism to institutional, rather than substantive, doubts. Holdovers
from the era when the Supreme Court threatened much of the New Deal,
the critics of the Warren Court "loved what the Court was doing but hated
the fact that it was doing it" (p. 219). On the other hand, he argues that
critics of the Burger Court all agree on the institutional question but are
unhappy with the Court because of "the breakdown of the New Deal consensus which the Warren Court pursued . . ." (p. 237).

That consensus

depended upon an assimilation of the values of individualism and egalitarianism (p. 226). The recent ascendency of group-oriented politics has made
this assimilation impossible, and the Burger Court is forced to confront inconsistencies between valuing the individual and valuing equality. Shapiro
thinks that the critics of the Burger Court are dissatisfied because they place
primary emphasis on equality while the Burger Court seeks a messy accommodation between equality and individualism (pp. 226-27, 237-38).
Shapiro and his coauthors are not remembering a time when the Court
could provide unambiguous moral uplift; they are imagining one. Although Burger Court opinions, like Warren Court opinions, can be criticized for failings of craft, including an irrational ad hoc quality, the moral
complexities and imperfections that are revealed in Burger Court opinions
and that so frustrate these commentators have always been inherent in the
political world. Inevitably, Warren Court decisions, too, were responsive to
many conflicting values. The Warren Court was willing to strike down
25
It
school segregation statutes but not to order immediate desegregation.
ordered that police use Miranda warnings but it did not go to the heart of
the problem of coerced confessions and order that all interrogations take
place with a lawyer present.2 6 It balanced national security interests
against free speech values.2 7 It equivocated when property rights conflicted
with racial integration.2 8 Nor were Warren Court decisions criticized only
on institutional grounds. They were strongly criticized for inconsistency
and hesitancy in the articulation and realization of public values. For example, critics charged that the Court had randomly allowed an occasional
pornographic publisher to be jailed and had justified the school desegrega25. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The Warren Court's hesitancy in
the area of school desegregation was criticized in Carter, The Warren Court and Descgregation in The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis 50-57 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer & R. Gooding eds.
1969).
26. Professor Kamisar discusses this point along with a number of other examples of
Warren Court compromises. See pp. 63-68.
27. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
28. For discussions of this equivocation, see A. Bickel, Politics and the Warren Court
169-72 (1965); Carter, supra note 25, at 49.
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to social science rather than to the
tion decision by unconvincing references
29
great moral principle at stake.
Shapiro also exaggerates when he attributes the modern consensus on
the Court's institutional role to a newer generation's disregard of the
Supreme Court's resistance to the New Deal. The commentators to whom
he refers surely remember recent political history; they have not forgotten
Lochner v. New YorkP ° and Carterv. Carter Coal Co. 3 1 Shapiro simplifies again
when he writes that the current dissatisfaction with the Burger Court exists
because the commentators favor equality while the Court pursues both
equality and individualism. Every author in the book must place some
value on individualism, as must the other commentators to whom Shapiro
refers. They are displeased with some of the specific compromises made by
the Burger Court, but these essays suggest a deeper source of dismay: an
inability to tolerate the complexity and uncertainty of the moral issues involved in public decisions and an impatience with the compromises that are
inevitable.
The malaise that Shapiro misdiagnoses exists for the same reason that
Shapiro and others romanticize the Warren Court. The memories of wars
are glorified because of a need for heroes, and the Warren Court is so enshrined because of a need for deeper roots in a political community-for
ties and loyalties that could reduce the need for moral simplicity in public
affairs. Those who know the Court to be a wholly ordinary and unholy
institution are demanding that it provide substitutes for political fellowship
and religious conviction.
A yearning for moral clarity and unity is entirely natural but must be
attenuated and matured by some sustaining world view. Consider the
needs left unfulfilled by the petty realism that dominates so much of this
book. In many of the essays the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's decisions is dealt with in a sketchy and uneasy way. The meaning of the Constitution-and by inference, political discourse generally-is continually
reduced to the calculus of interest group politics. The performance of governmental institutions is judged as if these institutions were no more than
29. For these as well as other criticisms, see, e.g., A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Progress 50-57, 65, 95, 117-20 (1978); P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the
Warren Court, xix, xxii, 127, 199, 204-05 (1970); E. Rostow, The Sovereign Prerogative
107-08 (1962); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1957); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150
(1955); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
20-34 (1959); supra notes 25, 28. At least some of the contributors to The Burger Court.- The
Counter-Revolution That Wasn't were less than satisfied with the Warren Court in its day. Professor St. Antoine criticized the Warren Court's labor law decisions for caution and "retrenchments." St. Antoine, Judicial Valor and the Warren Court's Labor Decisions in The Warren
Court: A Critical Analysis 133 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer & R. Gooding eds. 1969). Anthony Lewis
criticized the Warren Court's record on obscenity and on foreign travel restrictions. See
Lewis, Earl Warren in The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis 20-22 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer &
R. Gooding eds. 1969).
30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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the people who constitute them. The virtues of public institutions, like
those of individuals in the modern world, are peeled away until underlying
imperfections are identified; theories of social causation reduce further any
remaining sense of virtue. If this is the political world inhabited by the
legal establishment, "we" live in a barren place. The inhabitants of such a
world become more unhappy as they make the landscape bleaker. They
ask so much of the Supreme Court because their political and jurisprudential view can sustain so little, and in asking too much they assure continuing
disenchantment.

